Osama Bin Javaid's Blog

Musharraf: a landmark indictment for Pakistan’s democracy and constitution

Posted in News, Pakistan Curent Affairs by osamabinjavaid on March 31, 2014

Pakistan’s once most powerful man – a dictator, former military chief and president – has been indicted of high treason under the constitution of Pakistan. A first indictment for a military dictator in a country which has been predominantly ruled by them. When Musharraf ended his exile many wondered why he would give up an easy life in Dubai and London – maybe it was fate.

The former commando was adamant – saying he came back to save his country.”I was thinking the government would call me back, and would say ‘Save Pakistan’ but that did not happen. Today my nation ordered me to come back. I came back, putting my life in danger, to save Pakistan.” said Musharraf after landing to a small crowd in Karachi.

He failed to see that it wasn’t the same Pakistan which he ruled ten years ago – the judges who forced him out, were now powerful. Many were amazed at the stunt because Musharraf was forced out of power by the judiciary he tried to rule. And court cases piled up against him. Political analyst Mosharraf Zaidi says Musharraf represents a huge baggage  for the military and it’s unlikely he’ll spend any time behind bars.

Musharraf faces criticism for shortcomings ranging from
Benazir Bhutto’s killing , killing a Baloch separatist leader Akbar Bugti, mishandling of Lal Masjid ,  allowing U.S. drone attacks on Pakistan, sending Pakistanis for torture abroad , selling detainees for dollars , depriving Pakistan of economic boom at the start of the millennium and systematically destroying Pakistan’s institutions and many many more.

He had taken refuge in his farmhouse (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fvrxd812huk) and avoided several court hearings to escape indictment. Bombs were found, a Taliban letter was produced and in the most dramatic of the moves he fell “sick” during a drive to the court. Now Musharraf’s ailing mother has been taken to hospital in Dubai – and his lawyers are preparing a case to get his name off the exit control list to allow him to leave Pakistan.

But controversy was nothing new for Musharraf. In 1999 Indian and Pakistani troops came close to war in the Kashmiri area north of Kargil. During that conflict General Musharraf was plotting how to rule Pakistan. And he took power in a bloodless coup and later named himself President.

Then, two years later, after the September 11 attacks, Musharraf decided to align Pakistan with the so-called U.S. war on terror. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the Former Jamat i Islami chief  said the general buckled. “General Musharraf is under American pressure, this is not a war against terror this is a war against Islam”

Musharraf then supported the invasion of Afghanistan…though he later said the US had threatened to bomb Pakistan unless it joined the fight against al-Qaeda. Musharraf was in a fine balancing act. Managing a US-Pakistan relationship on one hand and trying not to completely sever ties with tribal fighters on the other.

Believed to have given approval for U.S. drones to operate from Pakistan, Musharraf also had to sign agreements with tribal fighters in the north. But his approach failed to stop the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda –whose attacks killed more than 50,000 Pakistanis in the last ten years. For the first time Pakistan had to deploy troops to the north to stop fighters from operating in Afghanistan. On the eastern border the relationship with India also saw some major lows.

And all his efforts to improve the economy were forgotten when Musharraf came under fire at home. The suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry in March 2007 triggered street demonstrations by lawyers and the civil society. And opposition parties also joined the protests. His political legitimacy was under attack – and the movement eventually led to Musharraf’s humiliating resignation.

And that’s where the spiral to the ground began. Musharraf returned to Pakistan despite these and many legal and political problems including from Taliban fighters – who tried to assassinate him three times during his time in office. He also found the hard way that he had very little support on the ground and all those who support him on social media aren’t voters in Pakistan.

Here are the formal charges he faces.

General (Retired) Pervez Musharraf may be formally charged as under:

a) Firstly, on 3rd November, 2007 at Rawalpindi as Chief of the Army Staff, he issued an unconstitutional and unlawful “Proclamation of Emergency Order, 2007” which, unconstitutionally and unlawfully, held the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 in abeyance and he thereby subverted the Constitution and thus committed the offence of high treason punishable under section 2 of the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (Act LXVIII of 1973), which is within the jurisdiction of the Special Court established under section 4 of The Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976).

b) Secondly, on 3rd November, 2007 at Rawalpindi as Chief of the Army Staff, he issued an unconstitutional and unlawful “Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007” which, unconstitutionally and unlawfully, empowered the President to amend the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 from time to time and he also suspended the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 25 of the Constitution and he thereby subverted the Constitution and thus committed the offence of high treason punishable under section 2 of the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (Act LXVIII of 1973), which is within the jurisdiction of the Special Court established under section 4 of The Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976).

c) Thirdly, on 3rd November, 2007 at Rawalpindi as President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, he issued an unconstitutional and unlawful “Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007” whereby an oath was, unconstitutionally and unlawfully, introduced in the Schedule which required a judge to abide by the provisions of the Proclamation of Emergency dated 03.11.2007 and the Provisional Constitutional Order dated 03.11.2007 to perform acts and functions in accordance thereof and this order also resulted in removal of numerous judges of the superior courts including the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan and he thereby subverted the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and thus committed the offence of high treason punishable under section 2 of the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (Act LXVIII of 1973), which is within the jurisdiction of the Special Court established under section 4 of The Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976).

d) Fourthly, on 20th November, 2007 at Rawalpindi as President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, he issued an unconstitutional and unlawful Order 5 of 2007 “Constitution (Amendment) Order, 2007” whereby Articles 175, 186-A, 198, 218, 270B and 270C were, unconstitutionally and unlawfully, amended and Article 270AAA was added to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and he thereby subverted the Constitution and thus committed the offence of high treason punishable under section 2 of the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (Act LXVIII of 1973), which is within the jurisdiction of the Special Court established under section 4 of The Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976).

e) Fifthly, on 14th December, 2007 at Rawalpindi as President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, he issued an unconstitutional and unlawful Order 6 of 2007 “Constitution (Second Amendment) Order, 2007” whereby the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was, unconstitutionally and unlawfully, amended and he thereby subverted the Constitution and thus committed the offence of high treason punishable under section 2 of the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (Act LXVIII of 1973), which is within the jurisdiction of the Special Court established under section 4 of The Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976).

The special court set up to try Musharraf has rejected his plea to visit his sick mother and seek cardiac treatment abroad. The court says removing his name on the exit control list is the prerogative of the government.

Stephen Cohen is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a South Asia Analyst. He says if Pakistan’s judiciary becomes vengeful, it will lose all the ground it’s recovered since ousting a dictator from power.” I’d hate to see the Pakistani system turn into a revenge system. The courts, judiciary and even the military should let justice take its course. But not treat him abusively. He’s been humiliated, he’s been disgraced but you don’t want to begin a process of hanging people of charges many others are guilty of.” said Cohen.

And that’s his defence so far. His supporters insist that it was necessary at that time to remove a democratically elected prime minister and Musharraf did not act alone. Legal experts agree that the constitution is clear that whoever “aided and abetted” in the acts of treason must face justice. Some argue that Musharraf’s case should be the beginning and all those politicians, judges, bureaucrats and generals who helped Musharraf subvert the constitution must now face the music. But the trail must not become a farce and individuals must be given a fair chance to defend themselves.

His critics call Musharraf a victim of his own vanity and arrogance. And now he faces the possibility of the death penalty. Although most commentators do not believe that he will face the death penalty BUT this indictment has set a precedent for future adventurers in the garb of patriotism and doctrine of necessity.

For Musharraf perhaps it’s the legacy he wanted to have – that of insisting on defiance with not much defence in the face of obvious repercussions.

 

SAUDI ARABIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PAK AFFAIRS

The latest wikileaks cables reveal that the Saudi monarch, King Abdullah believes that former military dictator Gen Retd Musharraf may be the best option for Pakistan’s security. Saudi intelligence chief frankly tells the americans about Saudi preferences: “Prince Muqrin said that while the King considers both Sharif and Musharraf friends, he considers Musharraf the better person to handle anti-terror issues.”

The candid behind-the-scenes details of Mr Sharif’s return to exile in Saudi Arabia shared by Prince Muqrin with the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Ford M. Fraker, are documented in a secret cable from the US consulate in Jeddah on Sept 12, 2007.

Delving into the complexities of Pakistani politics, Prince Muqrin also “speculated that there is probably an agreement between Sharif and the Pakistani Chief Justice, adding that if the Chief Justice grants Sharif the right to return to Pakistan and Sharif wins, the Chief Justice will become President.”

The Saudi prince went on to state “that he is almost certain the Chief Justice will side with Sharif, noting that he believes the run-up to the November election will be tense.”

The cable reveals that former prime minister Nawaz Sharif “thought he might be arrested” upon his return to Saudi Arabia after deportation from Pakistan on Sept 10, 2007, but Prince Muqrin, Head of General Intelligence Presidency, Saudi Arabia, gave Sharif “two options — he could either stay at a palace that had been prepared for him, or at his home. He opted to go to his home.”

“During Ambassdor Fraker’s meeting with Prince Muqrin, the Prince first summarised the ten-year agreement, brokered by Rafik Hariri, under which Sharif would live in Saudi Arabia and refrain from participating in Pakistani politics. He added that there was a verbal agreement that after five years, they would hold negotiations to consider reducing that ten year period,” according to the secret cable.

Prince Muqrin went on to describe “how Saad Al-Hariri warned Sharif not to return to Pakistan, but how Sharif disregarded the warning and went anyway.”

After Sharif’s forcible return from Pakistan to Jeddah, Prince Muqrin received the former Pakistani prime minister at the airport at which point the two discussed where Mr Sharif would stay.

Prince Muqrin also told Sharif that there would be “some restrictions” on his activities “for a short while, at least through the November elections, to reduce the likelihood of inciting rioting among his supporters in Pakistan.”

Ambassador Fraker was also told that “Sharif will remain in Saudi Arabia until after the Pakistani elections in November.” Sharif eventually returned to Pakistan on Nov 25, 2007, by which point elections were to be held in early 2008.

“The Prince explained that, as in Lebanon, the Pakistani constitution requires individuals working within the government to be outside government for two years prior to becoming President. Therefore a constitutional change would be required for Musharraf to become President.”

In a previously released cable from 2007, the Saudi ambassador to the US, Adel al-Jubeir boasts “We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are participants,”. A senior US official later bemoaned as “negative” the Saudi influence. Al-Jubeir added that for the SAG, stability in Pakistan is an essential strategic matter. Since Pakistan possesses both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, from the Saudi point of view, the policy choice to be made there boils down to a drastic choice: “We can either support Musharraf and stability, or we can allow bin Laden to get the bomb, “he told the Charge’.

In another cable from November 2008 by Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, was based on information from discussions with local government and non-governmental sources during his trips to the cities of Multan and Bahawalpur.

Quoting local interlocutors, Hunt attempts to explain how the “sophisticated jihadi recruitment network” operated in a region dominated by the Barelvi sect, which, according to the cable, made south Punjab “traditionally hostile” to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thought.

Hunt refers to a “network of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith mosques and madrassahs” being strengthened through an influx of “charity” which originally reached organisations “such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Al-Khidmat foundation”. Portions of these funds would then be given away to clerics “in order to expand these sects’ presence” in a relatively inhospitable yet “potentially fruitful recruiting ground”.

Outlining the process of recruitment for militancy, the cable describes how “families with multiple children” and “severe financial difficulties” were generally being exploited for recruitment purposes. Families first approached by “ostensibly ‘charitable’” organisations would later be introduced to a “local Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith maulana” who would offer to educate the children at his madrassah and “find them employment in the service of Islam”. “Martyrdom” was also “often discussed”, with a final cash payment to the parents. “Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rs 500,000 (approximately USD 6,500) per son,” the cable states.

The cable sent to the State Department stated that “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.”